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• Special operations can deter Russian aggression if 
used proactively to preclude Russian hybrid 
warfare in Eastern European non-NATO nations.
• Title 10 allows these SOCOM to act as the 
supported force, unrestricted by geographic 
boundaries.
Background, Question, Argument
• How can the United States military support a political warfare 
strategy to advance its national interest and deter Russia from 
advancing their own?
• The day after the Olympics in Sochi, Russia annexed Crimea and still 
have that territory with only economic sanctions as a consequence.  
Russia remains undeterred, to a degree, and in some cases Russia 
deters the U.S. and its allies from acting in non-NATO countries.  
• Unless the U.S. and its allies change their behavior toward Russia, 
they can expect more Russian success and Russian advances in its 
national interest.   The U.S. must rethink deterrence paradigms. 
• The United States can and should employ a strategy that incorporates 
strategic preclusion with special operations to deter Russian 
aggression and hybrid warfare.  This strategy would enforce a policy to 
limit Russian influence outside Russian borders, maximize positive 
United States’ influence in support of partnered goals, and act in 
accordance with U.S. national security interests, under Title 10 
authorities. 




• Main take-away from project
‒ Special warfare can respond to and deter Russian action
and it may be the only appropriate U. S. military response
• Surprising or counter-intuitive findings
‒ Similar strategies favor a stronger actor they also favor
the attacker, regardless of actor status.
The “So What” Next Steps
• Conduct modeling with the rest of the SOF core tasks to 
provide a comprehensive special warfare deterrence 
recommendations to a political strategy.
• Test special warfare against other potential military 
solutions
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Research design
• Russia does not see distinct lines between peace and war 
so we make the leap between operational and deterrence 
theories.  The majority of SOF’s strategic utility is when it 
employs as a supported force in an indirect manner.  
• D(x) = Cr + Ca + Co
• S(x) = (St * Wt1) + (RH * Wt2) + (TW * Wt3) + (RE * Wt4)
• SD(x) = S(x) * D(x)
• We also conduct a case study on Russian action in Crimea.  
Dr Hy S. Rothstein’s graphic depiction of Lamb & Tuckers SOF 
strategic utility concept 
